Strengthening the post-crisis fiscal rules ? the case of Spain, Slovakia and Sweden
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.12775/EQUIL.2015.012Keywords:
fiscal rule, fiscal policy, public debt, budget balance, public financeAbstract
The purpose of this article is to identify changes in the development of national fiscal rules in response to the crisis, in terms of the new economic governance in the EU. In-depth analysis was carried out on the example of the three countries that have the highest Fiscal Rule Strength Index, i.e. Spain, Slovakia and Sweden. The conclusions of the study were the basis for the formulation of recommendations for Poland. The research focuses on the new rules as well as the rules modified between 2007 and 2012. The key elements of creating fiscal rules and criteria used for their evaluation were recognized. The research shows that the strength of fiscal rules is determined by their legitimacy, the type of institutions monitoring them, the adjustment mechanism and sanctions, as well as the scope of the public sector, which the rule was imposed on. Short duration of most of the rules limits the ability to evaluate their effectiveness. However, the analysis of changes in the finance sector and local government in terms of new institutional arrangements allowed to conclude that the strong fiscal rules index is not a guarantee of maintaining public finance discipline, and the example of this was the varied fiscal position of the countries surveyed.
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