On the evolution of corruption patterns in the post-communist countries


  • Andrzej Cieślik University of Warsaw
  • Łukasz Goczek University of Warsaw




corruption, Markov transition probability matrix, post-communist countries


In this paper, we study the evolution of corruption patterns in 27 post-communist countries during the period 1996-2012 using the Control of Corruption Index and the corruption category Markov transition probability matrix. This method allows us to generate the long-run distribution of corruption among the post-communist countries. Our empirical findings suggest that corruption in the post-communist countries is a very persistent phenomenon that does not change much over time. Several theoretical explanations for such a result are provided.


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How to Cite

Cieślik, A., & Goczek, Łukasz. (2015). On the evolution of corruption patterns in the post-communist countries. Equilibrium. Quarterly Journal of Economics and Economic Policy, 10(1), 33–53. https://doi.org/10.12775/EQUIL.2015.002



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